

Power Relations in Bilateral Development Assistance

A case study of the Oil for Development programme in Timor-Leste

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Summary Review

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1.0 Introduction

This thesis will draw upon the conceptualization of power ~~in order~~ to reveal the power structure between Norway as a donor of bilateral development assistance and Timor-Leste as the recipient. A case study endeavoring to exemplify such structures has been conducted, demonstrated through the Norwegian Oil for Development (OfD) programme in Timor-Leste. I have chosen in this thesis to apply and rely heavily on the research done by Rita Abrahamsen (2004) and Caroline Hughes (2009) ~~in order~~ to investigate the power structure between Norway and Timor-Leste. I decided to do so because I wanted to see to what extent their theories of power in bilateral development assistance could be applied to the relationship between the two countries. I start out in this section by introducing the research problem, I will attempt to answer, and also to contextualize the problem by presenting in brief some relevant background material. Part two will introduce the concept of power and what definition this thesis will be based on by depicting the research of Abrahamsen and Hughes. The third section will comprise the methods employed for the research, and also the strengths and weaknesses will be accounted for. A background section on the two cases, namely the OfD programme and Timor-Leste, will be accounted for in part four before the fifth chapter presents and discuss the empirical material. After the discussion in the analysis, a concluding section will be the sixth and final chapter of the thesis.

1.1 Research problem

Current bilateral development assistance often emphasizes the importance of giving the recipient countries the responsibility for their own development, as allowing them to do

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so is regarded as more efficient. The recipient countries are for this reason now often being referred to as partners rather than recipients. The argument is that even if the donors let the recipient countries be the driver of their own development; power structures still exists, only somewhat more subtle (Abrahamsen 2004:1460-1461). This thesis sets out to investigate how such a relationship works, and what the structures of power that moves between the donor and recipient country are in the case of Norway and Timor-Leste. My research question is:

What potential power structures of bilateral development assistance exist in the relationship between Norway and Timor-Leste?

I will attempt to answer this by investigating the Oil for Development programme, how it provides bilateral development assistance and how it interacts with the Timorese government.

1.2 Background

Scandinavian countries are often perceived to be more altruistic when it comes to their aid policies than other donor countries. Stokke (1989) explains how the Scandinavian middle powers have since the 1970s been regarded as frontrunners in the field of aid policy. This due to not only their extensive official development assistance but also based on the way they have positioned themselves ~~in regard~~ to regarding the restructuring of the unfair international economic system. Their aid policies are claimed to be based more on their declared ethics than on their economic power (Stokke 1989a:9-10). Norway's aid policies could early on be determined to be following what Stokke labels as "the

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1. What are the impacts of Norwegian bilateral assistance on political openness in Timor-Leste?
2. What are the impacts of the Norwegian bilateral assistance on trade liberalization in Timor-Leste?
3. What are the impacts of the Oil for Food programme in the fishery and rice production in Timor-Leste?

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From the reading of this paper, "The main objective of this qualitative study is to investigate the impacts of the Norwegian aid policy on the Timor-Leste's economic policies."

Specific objectives:

1. To understand the influence of Oil for Food Programme on governance.
2. To understand the influence of Oil for Food Programme on trade liberalization.
3. To understand the influence of Oil for Food Programme on the state of fishery and rice production.

dominant sociopolitical norms of the domestic environment” (Stokke 1989b:211), meaning the altruistic objective to bridge the gap between poor and rich countries. That does not mean that in the early years of Norway’s aid policies, the intentions were solely based on altruism. Stokke argues that even if some countries are more altruistic than others in the field of development assistance, the conflict between altruism and self-interest will always be present (Stokke 1989b:211-212).

The petroleum industry is not particularly known for altruistic intentions or by prioritizing sustainable development over profit in the countries they operate in. There are however a few donors that try to address developmental issues through petroleum-related aid activities. Organizations such as the United States Agency International Development (USAID), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank are some. The Norwegian Oil for Development programme is one of a kind though because it incorporates several different petroleum-related activities into one single programme (Kolstad, Wiig and Williams 2009:955).

A More thorough background on the OfD programme and Timor-Leste will be presented in section four. The following section will explain the concept of power, how it will be perceived in this thesis, and how it has been applied to relationships of bilateral development assistance as understood by Abrahamsen (2004) and Hughes (2009).

2.0 Conceptualizing Power

There exists several ways of defining power, but perhaps the most traditional one is the definition that is associated with dominance. It can be seen as having the capacity to perform an action, and perhaps more used in Western political thought, also the *right* to perform such an action. Power, therefore, becomes an issue of sovereignty as it relies on obedience. This definition of power includes as such a certain level of consent, in the sense that the subject submits and obeys (Hindess 1996:138). This definition of power lacks, in my opinion, the necessary depth this thesis needs ~~in-order~~ to make an investigation of power relations in current bilateral aid assistance. I will, therefore, present below developed views on the concept of power in political theory, and how it can be contextualized to the field of bilateral aid assistance.

The following section will first give an account of Lukes' (2005) work on power, identifying three dimensions of the concept. Subsequently, I will show how Abrahamsen (2004) makes use of these dimensions to present a new view on power, in bilateral development assistance. The final part of this section will present Hughes' (2009) idea on how power in bilateral aid assistance affects countries that are dependent on aid, which she exemplifies using case studies from Timor-Leste and Cambodia.

Lukes identifies three dimensions of power and the first dimension contains similar aspects with the traditional view described above. He refers to it as the view often discussed as "pluralistic" by writers such as Dahl, Polsby and Wolfinger. This concept

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is too about direct dominance, where “A has the power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl quoted in Lukes 2005:16). Lukes argues here that what is central to this dimension of power is how the actual power is deliberately exercised by A over B. His point is that this view is very straightforward but fails to say anything about the behavior, that is the intention behind the making of such a decision. In this way, it is difficult to draw any conclusions on, for instance, how a political agenda is shaped. This aspect is addressed by Lukes as the second dimension of power. Here the concept is no longer reflected in concrete decisions only, but also as non-decisions. Using the example of shaping political agendas that Lukes puts forward would consequently mean that an actor has the opportunity to suffocate potential issues before they are presented or even voiced (Lukes 2005:22). This means that the institutional arrangements that surround a Decision-making arena cannot prevent the political choices from being biased from such a power dimension.

As a response to this, Lukes presents the third dimension of power ~~in order~~ to show the various ways of suppressing such ideas by controlling the interests that would create those issues in the first place. As Lukes argues:

“Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?” (Lukes 2005:27)

In this sense A is not visible as an actor holding power over B. A further argument is that the second dimension of power is unsatisfactory because it assumes that if people do not have grievances, then their interests are not harmed by the use of power either.

The third dimension of power argues however that people will subdue to the existing order without being aware of it, and in this way the power inflicted on them may work against their ~~own~~ interest.

Now that sufficient background to the concept of power has been covered, I will make use of the writings of Abrahamsen to explain how these are visible in the arena of bilateral development assistance ~~to~~. Her writings also add an expanded conceptualization of this in order to assist contextualizing what form power relations in bilateral development assistance can take.

2.1 Power relations in bilateral development assistance

Abrahamsen argues that bilateral development assistance relations can be seen as a form of advanced liberal power (Abrahamsen 2004:1453). She explains that current trends in North-South relations have since the 1990s emphasized ~~a~~ greater attention towards a shift in power structures where the recipient countries are given the responsibility for their own development. This implies that the donor country in a bilateral development assistance relationship is not to impose their views or strategies of development on the recipient country in question, rather it should be requested and approved by those receiving the development assistance. Her point is, however, that this is not the case in such relationships, and that a power structure still exists that is being imposed on the recipient country by the donor. The only difference is that this form of power is not necessarily visible in the sense of direct domination. She, therefore, argues that renaming such North-South relations and claiming to give the recipient countries control does not take away the donor power, rather the term bilateral development assistance itself

becomes an arena for a new form of advanced liberal power.

According to Abrahamsen, the different forms of power outlined in the previous section as defined by Lukes can be applied to bilateral development assistance relations. The first that entails domination has strong, visible neoliberal implications in the sense that it is done to promote or benefit donor interests, often at the expense of the recipient country. Examples of such conduct are, as Abrahamsen also recognizes, promoting the adoption of neoliberal economic policies and practices of good governance (Abrahamsen 2004:1458). Thus, this reflects the concrete decision-making power, but also the non-decision form of power is found in these bilateral relations. The issue of preventing matters of ever reaching a forum of discussion, much less the political agenda itself, is a concern that has been reflected in the literature on bilateral development assistance (Abrahamsen 2004:1458). Concerning the third dimension of power, Abrahamsen argues it can be reflected in more subtle forms such as the hegemonic ideology of neoliberalism that shapes actors to serve the interest of the capitalist system rather than the interests of poor countries. She sees certain sections of the African elite and bureaucracy as exemplifying such power relationships. Even though she regards all these dimensions of power important to current bilateral development assistance, she also puts forward another aspect that incorporates governmentality.

She regards the aspect of governmentality relevant because in this sense, power is not in direct opposition to freedom, but rather based on it. According to Foucault, the power of government is based on the actions of those who are free. He explains that it seeks to “affect the actions of individuals by working on their conduct – that is, on the ways in

which they regulate their own behavior” (Hindess 1996:97). Freedom is used by giving the recipient countries control of their own development. This way of thinking of development assistance is connected to how neoliberalism perceives that to govern less is to govern better (Abrahamsen 2004:1459-1460). It perceives aid as putting too much pressure on the recipient country and therefore by taking away this pressure of control, more efficient and effective development assistance will be experienced. This means that developing countries are no longer to be labeled as recipients of aid, but rather *partners* in bilateral development assistance. Hence, referring back to Foucault’s definition, this is a way of exercising power, by giving them the freedom in order to influence their conduct.

Abrahamsen presents how these new methods of exercising power can be regarded as technologies of agencies. Developing countries would be encouraged by the donor to pursue activities that would make them able to take responsibility by, for instance providing them with training in relevant skills and capacities (Abrahamsen 2004:1460). Thus, the donor of such development assistance would express a consideration of the recipients as free and capable actors that can take responsibility for their ~~own~~ development. The donor in this relationship would give them the freedom by creating the capable actors that the donor already expressed as responsible.

What I wish to emphasize by putting Abrahamsen’s aspect of power in bilateral development assistance forward to such an extent is to show the numerous ways that power can be perceived and forms it can obtain in this context. Power is as shown here not merely about direct domination, but can exist in techniques of cooperation and Abrahamsen provides a good perspective on how to look at such power in current

development assistance. Her opinion of power in bilateral development assistance provides this paper with a useful angle ~~on~~ of how the concept on power can be perceived in this context, and hence makes implications for how such bilateral development assistance relationships can be investigated. The perspectives on the concept of power and how it can operate in such relationships is ~~the~~ knowledge that proves useful when looking into specific examples of bilateral development assistance, and how it affects other issues such as aid dependency.

2.2 Power and aid dependency

The work of Hughes (2009) entails several explanations and underlying factors of the relationship between aid and politics in Timor-Leste. Even if these are all interlinked and part of a pattern that makes up the picture of an aid-dependent Timor-Leste, I have due to space ~~limitations~~ and in terms of the concentration of this thesis, chosen to focus explicitly on the findings that ~~relates~~ to power relations between donors and the local government as described below. The selected contributions of Hughes ~~was~~ (~~were~~) chosen ~~on~~ ~~the basis of~~ based on what I felt most relevant in relation to what I wanted to investigate, that means for example not deriving from Timor-Leste as a post-conflict state only, but rather as an oil nation with a growing capital, I also considered it in relation to what I felt was consistent with Abrahamsen's theory on power relations in bilateral development assistance.

Aid dependency is perhaps most used to describe the situation where aid is to a large or lesser extent impeding the enhancement of self-sustaining development (Riddell 1996:24). Although these factors tend to be explained mainly by economic effects, Hughes seeks ~~rather~~ instead to investigate the political. She argues that the *politics* of aid-

dependent development has not received much analytic attention, which is why her research examines aid dependent development from a perspective in which the power relations between the donor and the local political actors is unbalanced. She claims that because the donor holds ~~the~~ power instead of the local government, sovereignty is held hostage (Hughes 2009:1). The key condition to aid dependence is how the resources available to the donors overwhelm the local resources, and how local politics struggle to adapt to a form suitable to satisfy the international audience. In this sense, aid dependency becomes a way of exercising power for donors and possibly also national elites who benefits from such a relationship. Donors also exercise power by deliberately disclaiming responsibility. By arguing that any blame for potential failings of development assistance is the responsibility of internal actors, the donors ensure that they continue to uphold the moral upper hand in the relationship (Hughes 2009:8). It is not the recipients' addiction as such that is the issue, but the donors' ideological attachment to a neoliberal framework that prioritizes economic activity.

The donors arrive with the intention of presenting a developing country with what they refer to as the international best practice, and they claim to be able to do so using experienced international expertise. Hughes further argues that in the case of Timor-Leste, donors have used lack of capacity to justify international experts' supervision and assistance. Regardless ~~if~~ whether the issue of capacity building is needed or not, the argument is that this has been used to pursue projects of state-building and good governance that has been characterized as a means for spreading neoliberal economics after the cold war (Hughes 2009:5-7). The concern with this matter is whether the development of institutions of such standards considers the conduct of already existing local politics.

If to look at the relationship between Timor-Leste and a donor, it is important to take these factors into account to see how power can be played out by donors in an aid-dependent country. An explanatory background on Timor-Leste as a post-conflict nation with a strong sense of self-determination and its past with the international donor community will be presented in section four. The following section will present methods employed for the data collection.

3.0 Methodology

This section will explain how I gathered the data used in this thesis. It will also entail challenges I faced and lessons learned. The chapter is divided into five smaller parts that will describe the methods I applied **in order** to answer my research question. I will first present an explanation that elucidates my choice of doing a case study, followed by the interviews I did in the field and the material collected from secondary data. The fourth subsection will present my reflections on my positionality in the field, while the final part will present some limitations to the methods applied.

3.1 Case study

My objective was from the very beginning to investigate Norway's aid policy using the OfD programme. It took quite some time before I decided on the current focus of the study; it was the result of a continuously developing process that began with my preparations before leaving for Timor-Leste and ended in the aftermath of my return. I thought a case study of the OfD programme in Timor-Leste appropriate as it would allow me to perform the in-depth investigation. I wanted **of to understand** how the programme works with the recipient government. Bryman (2008) explains a case study as a detailed and

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intensive analysis of a single case (Bryman 2008:52). My intention with doing a case study was hence to investigate this particular case of bilateral development assistance and not using this research to generalize power relations as each relationship is different, and also each of the cases where the OfD programme is involved. I will elaborate on this in the limitations section of this chapter.

I chose with this case to conduct field studies in Dili, Timor-Leste and this became crucial for the outcome of my thesis in the sense that I find I would not have decided on this thesis topic without that experience. I was faced with a lot of impressions, and this affected my data collection, which I carried out by conducting interviews. This will be discussed further below.

3.2 Interviews

When conducting my field studies in Timor-Leste, I applied the qualitative method of semi-structured interviews. The reason I chose this type of interview method was because that it allowed me the flexibility to, for example, pose follow up questions. Due to my lack of experience I found it beneficial to be able to have an interview guide as well, but still being able to adapt it to each interview and change that with my focus accordingly. My interviewees where were those involved with the Oil for Development programme at some level, both Norwegians and Timorese, but also other international actors that had opinions including representatives from civil society. Some did not have a direct connection to the programme but could say something about the relationship, about being aid dependent or issues concerning the oil industry. I had several topics to discuss during an interview, which gave a beneficial outcome after the ended field study, as my focus did change on a few occasions. This issue will be further discussed in the

limitations part.

The interviewees ~~where~~ were hence selected by purposive sampling, in which case the participants ~~are~~ were selected ~~on the basis of~~ based on their relevance to the research, and has the objective to contribute to certain research goals (Bryman 2008:414-415). ~~When~~ After conducting one interview, it would often guided me to the next one, and my interviewees ~~were~~ often assisted with this. This is also known as snowballing where the researcher uses the interviewees to establish contacts with others relevant to the study (Bryman 2008:259). Dili is a small town in the sense that an “everyone knows everyone.” mentality exists. Therefore snowballing became a very easy and natural method as someone always knew what person to direct me to next. Timor-Leste is also very centralized around Dili, and the interviewees relevant for my research could hence all be found there.

3.3 Secondary Data

In addition to conducting interviews I also collected secondary data in the form of Norwegian- and Timorese government reports, and documents from NGOs and other relevant organizations. It was somewhat challenging to obtain updated secondary data as a lot of official documents in Timor-Leste are not published online or distributed efficiently to the public. Nonetheless, many of my interviewees ~~where~~ were very helpful ~~with in~~ providing me copies and giving me access to suitable material. Other secondary data found in this thesis are books and articles, providing mostly the material for the theoretical framework, but also newspaper and magazines contributions. The latter I found very significant because it has functioned as a good source for perspectives on the OfD programme and Timor-Leste.

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3.4 Reflexivity

An important aspect when doing research is being reflective about the methods employed, ~~about~~ **considering** the biases and values that lie behind the decisions that are made. In other words being aware of ones own subjectivity during research (Bryman 2008:682-683). I came to Timor-Leste as a young, female, Norwegian student for the purpose of investigating a Norwegian development assistance programme. Therefore how I positioned myself in this study is essential to discuss. As Rose (1997) argues, it is important to be aware of positionality, who takes on the role as insider and outsider and who has more or less power (Rose 1997:312). I believe I positioned myself as an insider in terms of the OfD programme considering the fact that I am Norwegian. I was to a large extent guided and included by the Norwegian contacts I had and they let me gain valuable insight to the programme. I found it difficult to explain my independence from the OfD programme to the Timorese I interviewed, both due to my nationality and my research topic. My awareness of my insider status when interviewing the Norwegians connected to the programme and the outsider status when meeting with the Timorese, led me to **actually** exploit this perception ~~in order~~ to get interview appointments. I found it fascinating this point that Rose brings up concerning power relations because when reflecting on my time there, I realize I was ~~in fact~~ involved in the very power relations I was investigating. I was taking advantage of the existing power relation between Norway and Timor-Leste by using my Norwegian contacts and presenting myself as Norwegian.

3.5 Limitations

The limitations that concern the methods employed is also to be stated before proceeding to the next chapter. First, one of the issues with the methods employed concerns generalization with a case study. As Punch (2005) notes a case study is focusing on one particular case but may make implications for others like it (Punch 2005:146). In this paper that could be whether some of the findings are applicable to other countries where the OfD programme is present. Since I do not know the specifics of other developing countries receiving this assistance I can not claim its potential whether or not to do so. My aim with doing a case study of the OfD programme in Timor-Leste is not an attempt to say that my findings will be applicable to other countries. My objective is to find implications of power relations between Norway and Timor-Leste using theories of bilateral development assistance, and hence not between such power relations in general.

The second issue concerns the focus of my study while in the field. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, I was faced with a lot of impressions when I was in Timor-Leste and this affected the focus of my research several times. The appendix showing the list of interviewees reveals that my focus was upon the environmental aspect for quite some time. This was due to the fact that they were not prioritized to the same extent as the other divisions of the programme. Not until I came home and looked at what data I had actually gathered my research question became clear. The relationship between Norway

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and Timor-Leste had through the entire process consistently been part of my research. I was aware of this, though what I was not aware of was the development of my investigation on this particular matter. If my research had been focused on this from the beginning then I would not have faced issues such as the problem of posing follow up questions within the time frame I have had at my disposal since my return.

The final limitation to consider is the language problem which is an immense issue in Timor-Leste. All the interviews I conducted were in English as it is an official working language that the majority of my interviewees had good knowledge of. I had to go into detail explaining many of my questions; however, without being sure if the person questioned fully comprehended what I was asking. In this situation, it became difficult not to ask leading questions, and I often had to ask follow up questions to test the answers of my interviewees. The language issues also affect the translation of the official documents, and it is, therefore, important to take into account that they too can have errors.

Now that the methods have been explained, the succeeding chapter will lead up to the analysis by providing the necessary background on the OfD programme and Timor-Leste.

4.0 Timor-Leste and the OfD: A background

This section will demonstrate the history of Timor-Leste and the aim and background of the Oil for Development programme. Acquiring an overview ~~over~~ of both the complex and violent history of Timor-Leste, and the objective and experiences of perhaps Norad's most discussed development assistance programme, is essential when later trying to understand the power structure of the relationship.

4.1 Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste, formerly known as East Timor, is a country with a history largely characterized by conflicts and struggles. Today this tired nation has its eyes towards the future with the third presidential election recently conducted, and with the parliamentary election following later in July this year. Formed when the Dutch and Portuguese colonized and divided the Timor Island in 1906, Timor-Leste was a Portuguese colony until 1975 which in the aftermath triggered a sense of nationalism and self-determination amongst the people (Molnar 2010:32-34). The decolonization process was disorganized and led to a civil war between the Timorese Democratic Union Party (UTD) and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), a war that ended with the UTD being pushed back to the western (Indonesian) part of Timor. Indonesia took this opportunity to claim FRETILIN to be of a communistic nature and hid behind this argument when invading the country, more or less ignored by the global community. By promoting economic development assistance for the country, Indonesia tried to convince the Timorese to accept the invasion (Molnar 2010:41-42,47-49).

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The fact that Indonesia used development assistance to influence attitudes amongst the Timorese people is very interesting in relation to this thesis because it makes implications of how Indonesia exercised power. It shows that even if it made use of violence, possibly the most direct form of power, when invading and subordinating Timor-Leste it needed to inflict power on a different level as well. Development assistance involving mainly the effort of creating jobs and building up infrastructure was a way of winning the people over and keeping them from resisting. The effort did not, however, subdue the opposition of FRETILIN (at this point led as a guerilla group) or the majority of the people. Assisted by the United Nations, 78.5 percent of the Timorese voted for their independence in 1999, although officially, Timor-Leste did not become a nation until 2002 where FRETILIN gathered most of the votes (Molnar 2010:59,75). In the years following, several incidents of unrest and internal conflicts have affected Timor-Leste, but in terms of violence, the country has now stabilized. Timor-Leste was soon after independence faced with the challenge of how to manage the income and wealth from the oil industry. After negotiating with Australia, it was decided that Timor-Leste would receive its share of the oil revenues from the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) in the Timor Sea. The petroleum fund was established in 2005, assisted by Norwegian experts, where arrangements of the revenues were made ~~in order~~ to avoid a resource curse and to hopefully secure the future benefit of coming generations. In 2007 the total asset of the fund was at USD 2.1 billion (Ministry of Economy and Development 2008:15), while in 2012 the total asset of the fund has risen to about USD 10 billion (Banco Central de Timor-Leste 2012). Despite these efforts to administer the revenues with prudence, the economic development has

been elusive and Timor-Leste is one of the poorest countries in the Southeast Asian region.

The revenues from the petroleum sector are the main source of income of the country, although the majority of the Timorese earn their income from the non-oil sector. In 2008 that sector only constituted for a GDP per capita of USD 365.1 (Ministry of Economy and Development 2008:15). The income of the non-oil sector, which mainly is the export of coffee, has been stagnant since 2002. The stagnant domestic economy combined with a rapid population growth, has become one of the main issues the country is facing. Some of the important trends in the non-oil economy have been a rapid growth in public expenditure, a high total consumption both public and private, reflected in the high import dependence. Also, government investments have increased, but still remains below 25 percent of non-oil GDP (2002-2007) and private investments have been low at around four percent of GDP and therefore not been a driving engine for economic growth (Ministry of Economy and Development 2008:25). Due to these unsustainable trends, the people of Timor-Leste could be said to actually be getting poorer and this despite the country's growing petroleum revenues.

The developmental problems do not necessarily lie with the lack of sufficient means. The main developmental issue in Timor-Leste could rather be related to the redistribution of the oil revenues. This issue is faced with two main concerns. One is that in order to avoid a resource curse there has to be a sustainable spending of the revenues which calls for a non-oil industry to provide a stable, additional income for the country. The other main concern is related to governance (Molnar 2010:144). How are decisions made and who makes them? The generally low education level in many of the

governmental positions, that is the lack of competence, results in severe administrative challenges that call for dependence on external assistance. This is strengthened when the few that do possess this competence are not given the appropriate jobs due to nepotism and political patronage. The problems that Timor-Leste is facing however can not only be blamed on poor governmental decisions. Aid dependency is a contributing factor that can be illustrated by an example presented by Hughes (2009). She explains how continued dependence in Timor-Leste has been secured by being advised, predominantly by the Asian Development Bank, not to allow foreign aid to be used for developing national programmes targeting sectors like fishery and rice production that actually would have the potential to enhance economic independence. The country is also very attractive to foreign donors, being known as a capable performer, reliable partner and first and foremost non-corrupt (Hughes 2009:142,151). Ever since the country became a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2010, the country has put a lot of effort into promoting itself as a leading nation within transparency. It should also be noted that while the initiative was established by the British government, Norway (Norad) is currently the coordinator (La'o Hamutuk 2010). Timor-Leste is hence a young, post-conflict nation with great oil revenues and poor development. Administrative issues as a result of subtle corruption and dependency on foreign assistance, are challenges that need to be met. The next section will present the Norwegian OfD programme, what its development assistance entails and how it has operated in Timor-Leste over the past years.

4.2 The Oil for Development programme

The Norwegian Oil for Development programme in Timor-Leste is an initiative by The

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) that provides development assistance to developing countries. This programme was launched in 2005 and is designed to assist developing countries with managing their petroleum resources in order to avoid a circumstance where the revenues retard rather than enhance economic development. This is more commonly known under the term resource curse. Norad's programme objective is expressed as followed:

"...economically, environmentally and socially responsible management of petroleum resources which safeguards the needs of future generations." (Norad 2012a).

The programme is structured by focusing on three thematic areas, namely resource-, revenues- and environmental management, in order to get a more extensive approach than the more technical petroleum related aid assistance Norway had been providing since the early 1980s. This would imply in other words, to start providing the countries in question with discretionary mechanisms that would generate economic growth, promote welfare to the population and be environmentally sustainable. Additionally, the programme is clear on its promotion of principles related to the concept of good governance, such as anti-corruption, transparency and accountability. As an advisory programme primarily, it is also intended for the purpose of increasing the competence and capacity level in the responsible authorities where the programme is operating (Norad 2011:3). Advisors from the respective ministries in Norway are therefore at hand to contribute with their expertise. The programme also puts emphasis on being demand-driven, meaning that Norad is to comply to the degree of demand from the recipient government.

The programme operates not only in Timor-Leste, but also in countries like Angola, South-Sudan, Uganda, Sudan, Bolivia and Nigeria. Critique has contested the programme for several years, questioning the integrity of the cooperation. Especially has the Norwegian media been eager to launch the discussion on the possibility that the programme is promoting Norwegian strategic interest in terms of oil, and hence not being altruistic to the extent they claim to be. This has been evident predominately in the countries where StatoilHydro has been or is active, such as in Angola and Nigeria. A common critique that has often been presented is the neoliberal approach Norad takes by the claimed inevitable link between the OfD programme and the Norwegian oil company StatoilHydro. Hansen (2007) argues that the two main problems are that the OfD programme is basing their assistance on the belief that the recipient country's leaders have the will to manage the petroleum resources in a just and sustainable way, but lacks the ability. It has been proved, however, that the Angolan government used the oil revenues to finance **their** civil war. It could, therefore, be argued that it is not the ability, but **in fact** the will is the problem. **In order** To address this, Norad has started to fund civil society organizations to function like "watchdogs." The other problem is that Norway through the OfD programme should protect the aid recipient country's interests, while at the same time securing profitable returns for the partly state-owned oil company StatoilHydro (Hansen 2007). Norway has taken on a difficult role as both a donor of development assistance and as an owner of an international oil company. In Angola, the Norwegian embassy that administers the Oil for Development programme also has an office for StatoilHydro.

Critique has also been given for the management of the programme, that the experts

consulted are often individuals that have had connection with Statoil and/or Hydro (before merged into StatoilHydro) (Sæbø 2009). The counterargument has often been that since Norway is a small country, naturally within a specific area there will be circulation of the same human resources. The programme is not, however, known for seeking out and drawing from foreign expertise. Kolstad et al. (2009) implies that no clear connection between the countries the OfD programme gives development assistance to, and the presence of commercial interest in the form of StatoilHydro can be found, however the possibility of connecting it to potential prospective markets should not be dismissed (Kolstad et al. 2009:962).

Norad claims that countries that are extensively affected by the resource curse, like Nigeria, are not ideally suitable for the OfD programme in the sense that the earlier the programme is implemented, the more satisfying the results will be. As Kolstad et al. inform, the OfD programme conducts risk analyses, looking at elements such as corruption, however, no country has ever been denied funding based on such an analysis. Norad, therefore, has activities in countries that are corrupt, although it should be noted that freezing of projects has occurred (Kolstad et al. 2009:961). This was the case in Nigeria where the OfD programme has been on hold for the last two years for reasons that are not stated clearly on Norad's web page. In an article for the Nigerian newspaper Vanguard, it is stated that both parties are now ready to revive the cooperation, and agree on a new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate's project manager, Steinar Njå, informed about the new agreement: "The main objective of the agreement is to assist in petroleum administration in Nigeria. At the same time, we see that such ~~an~~ institutional cooperation can also

make a positive contribution to the presence of the Norwegian oil and gas industry in Nigeria” (Steinar Njå quoted in Nwachukwu 2012). It can, therefore, be concluded that the OfD programme continues its activities, despite the evident presence of the resource curse, based on both altruistic intentions and of commercial interests.

In Timor-Leste, no immediate obvious connection to commercial interests can be made as StatoilHydro is not present. In Asia, Timor-Leste was in 2011 number 15 out of 28 countries that received aid funding, with 45.8 million Norwegian Kroner (NOK). Compared, the country rated at the top of the list for receiving the largest funds in 2011 was Afghanistan with 777.3 million NOK (Norad 2012b). Out of the OfD core countries, that is the main partner countries, Timor-Leste was number three on the list with NOK 21.6 million in 2010, behind Sudan with NOK 27.0 million, and Uganda with NOK 30.3 million (Norad 2011:12). Timor-Leste can, therefore, be said to be prioritized to a large extent by Norad and the cooperation between Norway and Timor-Leste has lasted for as much as ten years now. The OfD programme is to come to an end in 2012 as declared on Norad’s web page.

The OfD programme is present in several developing countries and has received as much praise as skepticism during its years of existence. As Norway has been involved in Timor-Leste since it officially became an independent nation, a lot of material to discuss exists on the relationship. I will in the next section provide my findings for the field study I conducted, and make some implications on what the data I gathered could be said to allege on the power relation between Timor-Leste as a development assistance recipient, and Norway as a donor through the Oil for Development programme.

5.0 The OfD programme in Timor-Leste

This chapter will use material gathered from my field study conducted in Dili in Timor-Leste, and discuss it using the theories of power presented earlier as seen from the perspective of Hughes and Abrahamsen. I will first discuss my data in relation to Hughes conception of power in an aid dependent Timor-Leste, and will then proceed by investigating capacity building before tying together my arguments by examining the demand-driven aspect of the OfD programme. The aim of this part is to shape implications for how the power relations between Norway and Timor-Leste can be perceived through the OfD programme and those targeted by it in the Timorese government.

5.1 Aid dependency

Hughes argues that donors use aid dependency as a means to exercise power in Timor-Leste. Ways of exercising such power is by promoting a neoliberal framework that prioritizes economic activity, also as the resources available to donors overwhelm the local, the local politics will struggle to adapt to a form that satisfies the donors. Moreover she argues that donors disclaim responsibility to ensure that they always have the moral upper hand (Hughes 2009:5-8). These techniques of exercising power will be discussed below.

The OfD programme's task is as stated earlier to assist with managing the oil resources by targeting the areas of resource-, revenue- and environmental management. Norway has provided technical assistance in terms of oil management since Timor-Leste's independence, but only since 2008 has the revenue- and environmental divisions been

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It seems your results take a theoretical approach. Is your main objective to test the applicability of the concept of power in bilateral relations? I'm not sure what the results intend to accomplish because you have no clear objective.

added to the programme. Of these three divisions the resource management has received somewhat more focus than the two others, and the environmental the least (Interview with Solveig Andresen). It could be argued that this has to do with little interest for the environment on the Timorese's behalf and as the OfD programme is demand-driven it needs to act in accordance with those requests. The interviews I conducted with the Timorese¹ however did not indicate that the environmental management was not prioritized, in fact it indicated quite the opposite. What I find could be an explanation for this is as Hughes also argues, the effort to try to comply with donor demands. They have been informed about the importance of environmental management and therefore communicate this when faced with such inquiries. One statement made regarding this was that the attention that the environment received was not the governments doing, but driven by foreign advisors like the ones on the OfD programme and other donors like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (Interview with Gillian Duggin). It should be noted in this respect that it was argued by an external international advisor and not a local Timorese.

¹ Referring in this sub-section repeatedly to the general shared opinion of the Timorese interviewees employed in governmental positions interacting with the OfD programme. Another interesting insight that was provided argued that an explanation to the difference in prioritization was to be found on behalf of the programme.

“The environment is not the highest priority within the OfD programme, and that could be natural enough as their main responsibility is managing the oil revenues.” (Interview with Arne Dalfelt).

This indicates that the difference in prioritization between the divisions of the

programme not necessarily lies with the lack of demand on the Timorese behalf, but rather could have been implied with the lack of prioritization by the decision makers at Norad. Considering the role of the OfD programme as advisory based, it could be that the focus of the programme has been too economic and that this has been subtly promoted to the Timorese government who would in all probability be eager to enhance the country's economic development. No one of the Timorese I interviewed admitted to any such problems with the programme, but this could again be acting like a "donor pet" in the sense that they would be cautious in criticizing the programme, afraid of damaging the relationship. Here again Hughes point on aid dependency could be applied, that the donor holds the power because the recipient country is dependent on the assistance it provides.

It is estimated that the government of Timor-Leste will be dependent on foreign assistance for the next 10 to 15 years (Interview with Vasco A.L. Leitão). There have been examples on how the government has acted against the advice given however; an example of such is establishing a national oil company (NOC). The OfD programme warned that the establishment should be considered carefully due to many pitfalls, like the large costs of it (Interview with Carlos Soares). When the NOC was established in July 2011 under the name Timor Gas & Petroleum (TimorGAP), a proposal for a megaproject was created, one that would involve receiving a pipeline from an oilfield in the Timor Sea. Australia received the first pipeline and now it was argued that the next should come to Timor-Leste (Interview with Francisco da Costa Monteiro). As the president and CEO of TimorGAP confirms:

"I believe that Timor-Leste can handle it, I believe and have to. I think the benefits

will overcome the consequences.” (Interview with Francisco da Costa Monteiro).

He further explains what it means to Timor-Leste to have a NOC.

“It will contribute to our economic development and human resource building (...)

I believe that Statoil would not have been as big as it is now and able to compete on the international market if it had not been a NOC from the beginning with the support of the country. It is important because it is nationalistic and develops resources and capabilities.” (Interview with Francisco da Costa Monteiro).

When I asked about the community responses in the areas that will be affected by this megaproject I was told that people were enthusiastic with regard to the job opportunities it would result in, and that overall a national megaproject would be good for the government as it would increase the economic development. It was also added that some locals opposed it, arguing that there were no benefits to gain (Interview with Rony da Costa), this was however brushed aside as ignorance.

It seems hence that there are two underlying motives for going against the advice of not pursuing the megaproject. That is the objective of economic benefits, but also as Monteiro emphasizes, it is about creating a nationalistic feeling which would indicate the symbolic importance of having a NOC. I would say that this shows a will of independence and self reliance. A counterargument against this megaproject is that it is unlikely to happen because the shareholders will lose profit on it, and they do not want to give that away (Interview with Charles Scheiner). It will be interesting to follow the development of this, because it will make implications for the Timorese persistence of such matters.

From this it could be assumed that promoting activities of the OfD programme that

enhances economic development, has a high priority in Timor-Leste's oil management. Whether this is due to lack of demand from the government or the promotion of the programme is difficult to decide on in this particular matter, but a combination may be the case. It also describes a situation where Timor-Leste shows itself as independent and willing to go against donor advice.

Hughes also explains how donors exercise power by deliberately disclaiming responsibility. Arguing that the blame for failings of development assistance is the responsibility of internal actors, ensure the donors that they continue to uphold the moral upper hand in the relationship (Hughes 2009:8). It could be argued that Norad closing down the programme is a way of not taking responsibility, even if such a case is not considered linked to failings per se. The reasons for the programme ending were somewhat unclear, and I have not been able to get a concrete statement on the matter which is weakening my arguments in this thesis, and that I would have looked into further had I predisposed more time. It is easy to speculate on the potential reasons such as budget cuts or Norway's personal interests in developing the oil industry. Concerning the latter however I was not able to find much that indicated any hidden commercial interest on Norway's behalf in Timor-Leste. The lack of it however, could be such an explanation for ending the programme. This is however to remain on a speculative basis, as I do not possess sufficient data to support it. The following was however indicated by Dalfelt:

"Another factor in Timor-Leste is that the country has not found oil on its own continental shelf, but have to share with Australia (...) that is why Statoil is not

present here yet and that Norway does not have business interests as such. If they do find oil on their own continental shelf however, it could be that a few Norwegian consultants will come to investigate.” (Interview with Arne Dalfelt).

As mentioned earlier, Kolstad et al. is too critical to dismiss the possibility of connecting it to potential prospective markets (Kolstad et al. 2009:962). The actual motives behind ending the programme is not the most crucial point I want to make, rather it is Norad’s use of the demand-driven concept as an excuse to close down the programme, giving Timor-Leste part of the responsibility for it. I will proceed with this argument in the subsection concerning the demand-driven concept.

I have on several occasions pointed out the importance of developing capabilities, and as capacity building is an essential part of the OfD programme, Hughes view of such activity as an excuse for international supervision will be presented next. The subsection will also include Abrahamsen’s view of capacity building and power.

5.2 Capacity building

The OfD programme’s main task is to build capacity within government institutions as increasing the competence of the public sector is not only important in regard to the actual execution of work tasks, but it also contributes to ensure good governance in the petroleum sector (Norad 2011:3). In Timor-Leste this is perhaps the most important part of the programme as the government often has the funds required, but lacks human resources. The competence that does exist however is often attracted to the oil related professions as it is the petroleum sector that provides the revenues for the state. The consequence of this is that other sectors like education and health for example, does not

become as attractive and hence will be more dependent on foreign assistance (Interview with Charles Scheiner). This has already become a concern, as it creates a dependence on foreign assistance in the other sectors.

As mentioned previously, the fact that the oil industry has the potential to provide jobs and projects is important. An argument has been that the oil industry should be developed further because it gives Timorese the motivation to study and compete with the international workers as they will know that once they have completed their education there will be a job waiting for them (Interview with Vera de Oliveira).

According to Oliveira, the National Petroleum Directorate (ANP) in Timor-Leste is seeing improvements in the capacity building. This is because a job within the ANP is highly sought after. The capacity exists where the money is, hence in the ANP and the Secretary of State of Natural Resources (SERN). The challenge for the OfD programme lies therefore in building capacity in the departments that are less attractive, such as the Secretary of State for Environment (Interview with Vasco A.L. Leitão).

Hughes argues that donors arrive with the intention of showing a country the international best practice, and claim to be able to do so using experienced international expertise (Hughes 2009:5-7). Even if this is the intention of the OfD programme as well they put emphasis on that their goal is not to export and apply a model, but acknowledge that finding new or other ways and solutions that differ from the ones intended by the OfD programme, not necessarily are wrong (Interview with Solveig Andresen). Abrahamsen (2004) argues that capacity building is just part of a political intervention to create modern subjects and that it shapes the behavior and choices of the country they offer assistance to (Abrahamsen 2004:1462). The OfD programme has a

scholarship arrangement that has received a lot of positive feedback. Pires explains that this is one of the successful elements of the programme and that it is desirable that it continues even after the official end of the programme this year. Many of those obtaining a degree through this arrangement currently hold key positions in SERN and have proved to be staff of good quality (Interview with Alfredo Pires).

The scholarships are often intended for education within the oil sector, which arguably is natural enough, but another issue is the fact that many of them are educated in Norway. This means that the Timorese staff will not only be shaped by the capacity building arranged by the OfD programme in Timor-Leste, but they are also shaped through the education at the Norwegian universities.

Afraid of being misunderstood in this section I would like to emphasize that I am not trying to label capacity building, and certainly not education, as a negative factor. I simply point out that through these activities and interactions there will be a transfer of attitudes from the donor side that will indeed shape the recipient. The next part will discuss the demand-driven aspect of the OfD programme.

5.3 Demand-driven

When exploring the different matters of the OfD programme's development assistance and techniques of power I am always led back to the fact that the programme is demand-driven and the issues that it involves. I will therefore discuss this in detail below.

The relationship between Norway and Timor-Leste has lasted for 10 years now. The collaboration began in 2002 and during the years up until 2007, Norway was more or less acting on behalf of Timor-Leste. Monteiro, who has a background as a board

member of ANP and at the commission for oil exploration, explains:

“On the positive side there was less trouble for us, we didn’t have to do so much ourselves, but on the other hand we were left out and did not get a chance to build up any confidence.” (Interview with Francisco da Costa Monteiro).

In 2007 there was a major shift of approach, and after some very heated discussion that lasted for over a year and a half, new terms for the cooperation were established. From there it has moved gradually to be Timorese people in almost all positions, at least the leading ones (Interview with Francisco da Costa Monteiro). This was also around the time that the OfD programme in its current form entered the scene and became demand driven; it is therefore not unlikely that these events were linked. Abrahamsen talks about how the trend has been to give recipient countries responsibility for their own development in bilateral development assistance (Abrahamsen 2004:1453) and this was what happened during this period. I did not manage to obtain a statement concerning the details from the Norwegian perspective of this transition, but the important part is the overall development the relationship has had over the years.

What is unique about the assistance provided by Norway is the length of the relationship. A big issue in Timor-Leste is that the programmes are too short, scarcely a year and a half long, whereas Norway has been present for 10 years (Interview with Carlos Soares). A relationship that has lasted for such a period of time has the benefits of becoming matured and with a high element of trust that allows for sharing differences.

“...initially it was a teacher to a primary school student getting to know the petroleum sector, and then as we evolved we were high school student and teacher,

and then university. It evolves and I do not see why we can not be partners.”

(Interview with Alfredo Pires).

This description of the relationship is important as it indicates a strong confidence that has been building up during the years. It also indicates that the Timorese has a strong desire to be treated as equals, and rather be partners than recipients. The material I gathered on this matter had several small contradictions regarding the opinion on the power balance, and I find it could be explained by mechanisms of subtle power as presented by Abrahamsen. That is power that does not employ direct domination over the Timorese, but bases itself on freedom still and uses this to direct the recipient to a path. In the case of the OfD programme in Timor-Leste I believe the demand-driven concept could be such a mechanism.

The last annual meeting of the OfD programme in Timor-Leste was held earlier in February this year. It was there agreed that the programme will continue throughout this year and then be reduced significantly. Pires, the chair of the committee, says that even if he feels confident that the Timorese can manage most of the areas themselves, he would argue for an extension of the programme as it would be needed for more specific issues concerning advanced and constantly evolving technicalities. The request for further assistance was also expressed at the National Directorate for Environment (DNMA). It was argued that practical matters such as arranging meetings and analyzing documents from international oil companies were particularly needed. It was also stressed that more training and system development had to be conducted, and that the leaving advisors had to be replaced. It was also added the OfD programme paid for everything, including all the equipment at the department (Interview with Francisco

Poto). These statements make it clear that there is still a demand for the OfD programme in Timor-Leste, and as the programme is demand-driven I question its reason for ending.

The argument that is being put forward is that Norway has been present in Timor-Leste for a long time, and since nothing lasts forever it is time for it to end. As mentioned earlier, by comparison of other development assistance programmes, Norway has been present for quite long. On the other hand, when it is stated that Timor-Leste will be dependent on foreign assistance for the next 10 to 15 years, it can be argued that it is in fact not so long; rather the programme is only half way there. It is a matter of consistency that if a team is working well it should not be changed and certainly not close down. The lack of consistency among donors has been one of the major issues for Timor-Leste and one of the reasons for them still being aid dependent as they are not offered a long term platform to grow and evolve on (Interview with Vasco A.L. Leitão). Another argument for the programme to close down has been the lack of demand.

“We have said that the programme is a success when we no longer need it and that is the feeling we are getting now. That we are pushing the advisors away, they offer to do something and we feel that we can handle it ourselves in stead.” (Interview with Carlos Soares).

There seems however that this lack of demand that is referred to, is true in some areas and not in others. My argument is too that the OfD programme should see the lack of demand where it is present as a success, but that it should answer to the demand and concern that still exists. As Leitão states:

“They cannot stop the assistance; it is a shame if the project itself finishes in 2012.

The loss will be on Timor-Leste's side for sure, at least in terms on environment.

(Interview with Vasco A.L. Leitão).

I will, as stated earlier, not speculate too much upon the motives behind the closing of the OfD programme. I do however argue that the programme has used the demand driven concept to give the impression of a transfer of power from Norad to the Timorese government. The statement that they should be in control of their own development is, as Abrahamsen explains, an illusion based on the notion of freedom. From this I argue that power does exist in this action between the programme and the Timorese government, simply because such freedom is *given* by the donor where it should not be theirs to give. I also argue that this intended shift in power structure from Norad to the Timorese government is not a reality as a demand still exists.

Power can hence take many forms in bilateral development assistance, even subtle ones that are not easy to detect. It is however important that both donor and recipient are aware of these power structures because that may be a way to reduce them. Hence, the OfD programme should regard the Timorese confidence and self reliance as a success in the areas where that is expressed, but show consistency and prove their altruistic intentions by responding to the demand for further development assistance in the areas where it is needed.

“The petroleum sector will never be one hundred percent Timorese; it is too naïve to say that there is no more need for assistance, but less is needed and now the Timorese are in the lead and the advisors in the back.” (Interview with Franscisco da Costa Monteiro).

6.0 Conclusion

The purpose of this final section is to identify some limitations and to summarize the main points outlined in this thesis. There are several aspects that have not been considered in this paper due to limited space and time. Issues that complicate the relationship between the OfD programme and the Timorese government are for example language and subtle forms of corruption like nepotism and political patronage. It needs to be emphasized that even if this thesis has tried to make implications for the power structure, the picture presents itself vastly more nuanced than I could portrait here, both on the Norwegian and Timorese side.

Another limitation is as mentioned in the method section, that the analysis contains data mainly gathered from the environmental perspective as I did not alter my focus until after completing the field studies. I therefore admit that the analysis is somewhat limited to this perspective, and some of the complementary data I tried to obtain after my return did not reach me in time. This has consequently affected my use of theory and data together and some arguments could have been developed further that would have given the paper and my findings a more satisfying arrangement.

The aim of this thesis was to try to identify potential power structures that exist in bilateral development assistance and in this case between Norway and Timor-Leste. A case study of the Oil for Development programme was conducted by examining how it delivers its development assistance and how it interacts with the Timorese government. Relying mostly on the works of Hughes (2009) and Abrahamsen (2004) I argue that despite the well known altruistic intentions of Norway's development assistance, subtle

forms of power is being exercised by the OfD programme, some to Timor-Leste's disadvantage.

This thesis argues that Timor-Leste's aid dependency is being used as a way of exercising power. Hughes argues that power structures undermine local politics and that Timor-Leste as an aid dependent country will strive to satisfy the donor. I found here that examples exist where the Timorese in fact have gone against the advice of the OfD programme, such as establishing a national oil company and engaging in the pipeline megaproject. Capacity building is seen by Hughes and Abrahamsen as a way of exercising power by using it to shape the behavior, attitudes and hence choices of the recipient country. Capacity building is the most important part of the OfD programme. Hughes also argues that donors are fixed on a neoliberal framework that prioritizes economic activity. Timor-Leste is eager to enhance its economic development and the OfD programme has given more attention to the economic activities. My argument here is somewhat weak however, because as demand-driven, the OfD programme can protect itself against such accusations by justify its priorities as a response to lack of demand, a demand I on the other hand found was very much present in the environmental department.

The demand-driven concept became my main illustration of subtle power techniques between Timor-Leste and the OfD programme. I argue that Norad uses this concept to hide its sovereignty of power. Abrahamsen says that power structures in current bilateral development assistance often are based on freedom by giving the recipient country the ownership of the development programmes. The demand-driven aspect of the OfD programme is meant to give the Timorese government such control. I found

however that despite an existing demand for further assistance, the programme is now coming to an end. It will be exiting to see how the relationship between Norway and Timor-Leste develops this year.

What would be interesting to look at further is how donors are fuelling the oil industry in Timor-Leste and how this affects the non-oil industry. With the sharp decline of donor presence in Timor-Leste the last and probably coming years, unemployment will become a growing problem that the oil industry alone will not be able to address.

Timor-Leste will need to put weight on developing non-oil industries if they are to stop being aid dependent. As the donors hold much of the responsibility for this I think it would be interesting to look at *how* this is to be done and important in that process, what part donors should and could play.

Appendix

List of interviews conducted in Dili, Timor-Leste between January and March 2012

Alfredo Pires, Secretary of State of Natural Resources (SERN), SERN office
Fomento Mandarin, 09.03.2012.

Arne Dalfelt, Former Senior Environmental Advisor World Bank, Esplanada Hotel,
27.01.2012.

Carlos Soares, Project Implementer for the Norwegian Petroleum Assistance
Programme/OfD - State Secretariat for Natural Resources, Cafe Brazil, 28.02.2012.

Charles Scheiner, Founder La' o Hamutuk, La' o Hamutuk office, 02.03.2012.

Francisco Poto, Chief for Department Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) at the
National Directorate for Environment (DNMA) of the Secretary of State for
Environment -Ministry of Economy and Development, DNMA office Fomento
Mandarin, 16.02.2012.

Francisco da Costa Monteiro, President and CEO Timor Gas & Petroleum (Timor
GAP, E.P), TimorGAP office Timor Plaza, 20.02.2012.

Gillian Duggin, Volunteer legal advisor AUSAid for Secretary of State of Environment,
Local Café near Fomento Mandarin, 29.02.2012.

Rony da Costa, Manager of Health, Safety, Environment (HSE) Timor Gas &
Petroleum (Timor GAP, E.P), TimorGAP office Timor Plaza, 22.02.2012.

Solveig Andresen, Senior Environmental Advisor Oil for Development NORAD, Vila
Mataruak, 29.01.2012.

Vasco A.L. Leitão, Chief Executive Officer Oasis – Sustainable projects (Consultancy in Environment, Planning & Development, & Technical Translations), Secretary of State for the Environment Office Fomento Mandarin, 21.02.2012.

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